Most people are aware of typical online scams, using intentionally misspelled words to weed out the savviest individuals and instead draw in the most defenseless targets. Very few, however, are aware of more recent scams targeting some of the most trusted people on the planet.
In a coordinated effort led by the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), FBI, and Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), U.S. authorities have issued a stark warning to current and former government personnel and government contractors, especially those with security clearances: You are being targeted online—by foreign intelligence services, most notably the Chinese government.
Who is at Risk?
If you:
- Currently hold or formerly held a U.S. government security clearance,
- Work or have worked in sensitive government, military, or national security-related industries,
- Have access to confidential intellectual property,
- Are an academic or researcher working on confidential projects,
- Have access to proprietary, classified, or strategically valuable information,
Or have any employees meeting the foregoing criteria, you are a target. Even if you are now retired or working in the private sector.
China’s Playbook
Using LinkedIn and other professional networking platforms, Chinese intelligence operatives—posing as headhunters, recruiters, or fellow professionals—reach out to U.S. personnel under false pretenses.
Their goals:
- Elicit sensitive information.
- Gauge potential for recruitment.
- Establish long-term influence or access.
These are not amateur scams—they are calculated long game operations run by state-sponsored actors who speak fluent English, understand U.S. corporate culture, and work with patience and precision.
Be Aware of the Tactics
Foreign intelligence services, especially the People’s Republic of China (PRC), use the following strategies:
- Fake job offers on sites like LinkedIn to lure targets into disclosing sensitive career information.
- Social engineering, where targets are slowly cultivated through casual and professional exchanges before being asked to share protected or strategic information.
- “Soft approaches” through think tanks, academic conferences, or consulting gigs—especially appealing to retired professionals seeking post-career opportunities.
- Digital impersonation of U.S. government organizations, defense contractors, and legitimate recruiters.
Red Flags
How do you tell if you are being targeted by a foreign intelligence service? At the outset, there is no way to know for sure, but here are some clues:
- The offer sounds too good to be true: The job offers remote work at a high salary.
- Flattery: They praise your skills and refer to you as a “high-end” or “valuable” candidate.
- Scarcity: The job seems custom designed for your skillset.
- Lack of depth/detail: It is hard to find information about the company and/or the job itself. The job description lacks tangible details.
- Urgency: They are extremely responsive, state that the opportunity could slip away, and/or pressure you to communicate via another platform of their choosing.
How to Protect Yourself
- Be Skeptical of Unknown Contact Requests
Don’t accept connection requests from unfamiliar individuals—especially those claiming to be foreign professionals or recruiters. - Verify Job Offers
Legitimate recruiters will not ask for personal, financial, or sensitive information in early stages. - Report Suspicious Outreach
If something feels off, trust your gut. Contact your agency security office or the FBI via https://tips.fbi.gov. - Educate Colleagues and Family
Share this knowledge with others who may also be targets—including those no longer in service.
Do Be Zhao
While there have been many convictions for espionage, one particular case exemplifies how foreign governments may soft sell you into giving away your secrets. On January 8, 2024, U.S. Navy petty officer Thomas Zhao was sentenced to 27 months in prison and ordered to pay a $5,500 fine for transmitting sensitive U.S. military information to an intelligence officer from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in exchange for $14,866.
Zhao was initially approached by an individual in a social media site through a stock trading chat group. The individual fostered a relationship with Zhao, eventually paying him more and more money for more and more information relating to sensitive U.S. military data.
While everyone believes it could never happen to them, as unbelievable as it may seem, many former clearance-holders have unknowingly walked into this type of the trap laid by foreign intelligence agents. The success of these types of operations, against savvy professionals, indicates just how subtle—and dangerous—these operations can be.
If Contacted, What Should You Do?
- Revise your online accounts to avoid broadcasting your security clearance.
- Only form connections online with people you have verified as legitimate.
- Notify your security officer of any suspicious communications you have received.
- If you are a former U.S. government clearance holder, contact your nearest FBI office to report malicious targeting on professional networking social media sites or submit a tip online at tips.fbi.gov.
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