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Like a Bad Penny, Congressional Attempts to Legalize Site-Blocking Have Returned

Brett Trout

More than a decade ago, Americans stood together to stop Congress from enacting both the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the PROTECT IP Act (PIPA)—two bills that threatened to shatter the foundation of a free and open internet. Back then, I wrote about the many dangers of SOPA, PIPA and site-blocking in general. 2012 moment marked a powerful public rejection of government-mandated internet censorship. Today, Congress is back with a new version of the same dangerous idea: the Foreign Anti-Digital Piracy Act (FADPA). And once again, it’s time to say no.

FADPA: The Return of a Bad Idea

FADPA is being pitched as a narrowly tailored solution to target large-scale, foreign-run piracy websites. Supporters claim it will protect American jobs, creativity, and online safety—all while respecting due process and free speech.

But a closer look reveals a different reality: this bill revives the same dangerous concept that made SOPA toxic. It creates a legal mechanism to block access to entire websites—on the mere allegation of copyright infringement—without giving those websites a meaningful chance to defend themselves.

Who Watches the Watchmen?  

While FADPA comes equipped with promises of judicial oversight, if the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act taught us anything, it is that the federal judiciary is often nothing more than a rubber stamp when it comes to approving unconstitutional government overreach. Even if the government was capable of overseeing itself, FADPA is still a censorship tool that enables powerful media companies to control your access to information. That should sound alarm bells for anyone who cares about digital freedom, innovation, or democracy.

Why Site-Blocking Doesn’t Work

Supporters of FADPA tout examples from the UK, Australia, and Portugal where site-blocking has reduced piracy traffic. But the truth is more complicated.

Modern websites often rely on shared hosting and cloud infrastructure. Blocking one infringing site could unintentionally shut down hundreds of unrelated sites—small businesses, nonprofits, personal blogs—collateral damage in a war they had no part in. Government-connected large companies and pirates are already prepared for this. Independent companies and individuals are not.

Even if one of the websites shut down as a result of FADPA was a pirate website, these determined infringers can simply set up shop on a new domain within hours. VPNs and DNS tweaks are simple tools that render site-blocking efforts easy to bypass for those who make it their business. These tools are vital lifelines in authoritarian countries, where they help people access independent news and uncensored content. Forcing Americans and small independent American companies to rely on those same tools is an unacceptable outcome of domestic legislation.

A Blunt Instrument That Silences Legitimate Speech

Congress has a long and storied history of passing legislation that does exactly the opposite of what it purports to do and FADPA is no different. FADPA does not just threaten pirate websites—it threatens everyone. A site that is incorrectly blocked won’t display a helpful notice or explanation. It will just vanish. To users, it will look like a glitch. Lawful businesses and content creators could be shut out without warning or recourse.

Worse, the process is often “ex parte,” meaning the accused website operator isn’t even present to defend themselves. That is not justice—that is corporate-driven censorship masquerading as copyright enforcement.

History Shows We’ve Been Here Before

In 2012, the internet community rose up against SOPA and PIPA. Tech companies, advocacy groups, and millions of internet users protested the dangerous overreach of site-blocking laws. FADPA may wear a new face, but it raises the same old threats: chilling effects on speech, unjust takedowns, and a fundamental shift in how the internet operates.

Even Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren, who introduced FADPA, was once a key opponent of SOPA. Today, she insists FADPA is more measured, fairer. But even well-intentioned tools can be turned into weapons. Giving courts and corporations the power to block websites—even foreign ones—sets a precedent that can, and will, be expanded, abused, and exported.

What We Need Instead

There’s no question that digital piracy is a problem. But the answer isn’t to undermine the architecture of the open web. Instead, we should:

  • Support innovation in legal content distribution.
  • Fund smarter enforcement strategies focused on the actual bad actors, not the infrastructure that powers the web.
  • Promote transparency and accountability in any copyright enforcement mechanism.

The Bottom Line

FADPA is not just about piracy. It is about power—who has it, who gets to control what we see online, and how easily that control can be misused.

Once again, we find ourselves at a crossroads. We can either defend the internet as a free and open platform for expression and innovation—or allow it to be slowly fenced off by private interests and government overreach.

So what can you do? Contact your congressional representatives directly and tell them that site-blocking is not the answer. We must not repeat the mistakes of the past. We should instead look to build a better digital future—one where creativity is protected, and freedom is preserved.

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